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Many factors are known to influence the inference of the discourse coherence relationship 
between two sentences. Here, we examine the relationship between two conjoined embedded 
clauses in sentences like The professor noted that the student teacher did not look confident and 
(that) the students were poorly behaved. In two studies, we find that the presence of that before 
the second embedded clause in such sentences reduces the possibility of a forward causal 
 relationship between the clauses, i.e., the inference that the student teacher’s confidence was 
what affected student behavior. Three further studies tested the possibility of a backward causal 
relationship between clauses in the same structure, and found that the complementizer’s pres-
ence aids that relationship, especially in a forced-choice paradigm. The empirical finding that a 
complementizer, a linguistic element associated primarily with structure rather than event-level 
semantics, can affect discourse coherence is novel and illustrates an interdependence between 
syntactic parsing and discourse parsing.
Keywords: discourse coherence; causality; complementizers; coordination; sentence 
comprehension 
1 Introduction
Interpreting a sentence of natural language depends on the integration of a number of 
different levels of structure and meaning. A comprehender must understand the syntactic 
relationships that hold internal to that sentence as well as the semantic and pragmatic 
relationships that link that sentence to the larger discourse context. The inference of 
relationships between sentences or between propositions supports the establishment of 
overall discourse coherence, by which a comprehender makes sense out of the separate 
parts of a discourse. 
In this paper, we focus on the link between markers of syntactic structure and compre-
henders’ inference of cross-clausal coherence relations. First consider (1):
(1) A new mayor was elected. There was a riot.
The two sentences in (1) are structurally independent but could be understood to convey a 
forward cause-effect sequence whereby the mayor’s election preceded and caused the riot. 
In (1), such a relation could be left implicit or else marked with an explicit connective like 
As a result. A cause-effect sequence is just one example from a larger inventory of posited 
coherence relations, which include other causal relations (like the backward causal rela-
tion marked by because) as well as relations whose establishment depends on other types 
of reasoning, e.g. additive or contrastive (Mann & Thompson 1988; Polanyi 1988; Hobbs 
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1990; Sanders et al. 1992; Roberts 1996; Kehler 2002; Asher & Lascarides 2003; Prasad 
et al. 2008). Without an explicit connective between the two sentences, the inference of 
a connection between the two propositions depends largely on a comprehender’s world 
knowledge and, in the case of (1), on general reasoning about political elections and social 
unrest, along with a well-documented bias for inferring causal connections (Trabasso & 
van den Broek 1985; Louwerse 2001; Sanders 2005). Comprehenders can also rely on 
the presence of a variety of lexical cues to identify the speaker’s intended coherence rela-
tion: verb semantics, tense/aspect, negation, etc. (Kehler et al. 2008; Webber 2013; Asr & 
Demberg 2015; Dery & Koenig 2015). However, such cues typically contribute their own 
meaning and influence the sentence-level semantics and the discourse-level coherence 
relation in complex ways.
In the studies reported here, we examine effects on coherence from a lexical cue that 
contributes little semantic information to the sentence. Specifically, we test how the 
complementizer that influences coherence relations in embedded contexts like (2). These 
examples and the observation of the effect of the complementizer come from Bjorkman 
(2010, 2013).
(2) a. The newspaper reported that a new mayor was elected and there was a riot.
b. The newspaper reported that a new mayor was elected and that there was 
a riot.
In (2a, b), the propositions about the mayor’s election and the occurrence of a riot are 
embedded under a verb which takes a sentence complement.1 As in (1), it is easy to 
interpret the election as the cause of the riot (a causal coherence relation), but it is also 
possible to interpret the two events as independent occurrences, which are mentioned 
together only because the newspaper reported both of them (what we will call the paral-
lel or non-causal relation). The presence of the two complementizers in (2b) makes the 
syntactic relationship between the matrix and embedded clauses explicit, but the same 
embedding is supported even without the second complementizer, as in (2a).  Bjorkman 
(2010, 2013) proposes that a non-causal interpretation is only available in contexts with 
a second overt complementizer, as in (2b), whereas the causal interpretation arises  easily 
without the overt complementizer, as in (2a). The complementizer is a grammatical 
cue whose impact on sentence meaning can be said to arise indirectly via the embed-
ded structure it signals at the syntactic level—or, at the semantic level, the subordinate 
dependency it creates between the embedded clause and its embedding verb (Portner 
1992, 1997). Portner proposes that the role of that is to make the embedded proposition 
dependent for its interpretation on the matrix clause, such that the embedded proposi-
tion can receive its modal force via combination with the embedding verb. However, the 
complementizer itself contributes little to the propositional content, i.e., the event-level 
semantics in a comprehender’s mental model of who did what to whom. This is apparent 
in the optionality of the complementizer: John reported (that) Mary left indicates the same 
event in either form. 
As such, what is intriguing about Bjorkman’s observation is that it highlights a 
small grammatical cue that may have the capacity to guide coherence establishment. 
The form of the sentence (the presence or absence of the overt complementizer) 
 1 There is an alternative syntactic structure for (2a) in which the second clause is not embedded at all and 
therefore it is the report of the election that may be interpreted as causing the riot. In that case, there is 
only one embedded clause, and the clause about the riot is conjoined at the higher sentence level. We will 
return to this in the presentation of our study materials, but what is of primary interest here is the reading 
in which the newspaper reports two events.
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has the potential to determine the discourse-level meaning (a causal or non-causal 
 coherence relation). It is also intriguing because the cue stands to undermine the 
well-known preference for causal inference. The studies reported here experimentally 
test Bjorkman’s claim and explore the possibility of gradience in participant judg-
ments. Does the presence or absence of the second complementizer in passages like 
(2)  influence comprehenders’ inference of a causal connection between the embed-
ded propositions? Are non-causal interpretations available in constructions with and 
without the complementizer, or are they restricted to those with the second overt 
complementizer present?
The embedded structures that we target in this paper are not typical contexts for the 
study of coherence establishment, a domain which usually focuses on intersentential rela-
tions. However, there is a growing literature investigating the way that subsentential 
elements participate in coherence relations: prior work has identified contexts in which 
coherence relations hold between a matrix clause and a relative clause (H. Rohde et al. 
2011; Kehler & Cohen submitted), a free adjunct (Stump 1985; Kortmann 1991; Reid 
2015), or even an adjective (Webber 1991). When coherence relations operate within 
the sentence, this creates an opportunity for structural factors to interact with coherence 
relations in a way that is not possible in cross-sentence coherence relations. The studies 
reported here therefore draw attention to the interdependence of syntactic parsing and 
discourse parsing.
In the next section, we review literature on causal inference as a default, on known lexi-
cal cues that guide coherence establishment, and lastly on the role of the optional com-
plementizer that in sentence processing. The paper then presents a series of studies using 
a variety of different probes. We test how the interpretation of a causal relation between 
two embedded clauses is affected by the presence or absence of the optional complemen-
tizer. When the second embedded clause is introduced by a complementizer, we find the 
predicted decrease in measures of forward causal inference. In addition, we test for the 
availability of a backward causal interpretation and find that it improves with the pres-
ence of the complementizer. Our results go beyond Bjorkman’s proposal and existing 
work on subsentential coherence relations by using experimental evidence to demonstrate 
that a lexical element which provides limited semantic information can have repercus-
sions for pragmatic inference.
2 Background
2.1 Causal inference 
Reasoning about relationships between events is fundamental to the ability to interpret 
not just text, but the world around us. The ability to infer causal connections underlies 
human understanding of physical systems (e.g., Shultz 1982), others’ mental states (e.g., 
Perner 1991), and essential but unseen properties of objects (e.g., Gelman & Wellman 
1991). Within psycholinguistics, strong claims have been made regarding the centrality 
of causal relations to discourse interpretation: e.g., Trabasso and van den Broek’s (1985) 
emphasis on explanatory inferences in text understanding and Sanders’ (2005) causality-
by-default hypothesis. 
Comprehenders have been shown to favor causal connections in text, and such connec-
tions facilitate comprehension and recall (Trabasso & Sperry 1985; Trabasso & van den 
Broek 1985). Sanders argues that causal connections are processed more easily (Mak & 
Sanders 2012) and serve as an interpretational default (Sanders 2005), marshaling evi-
dence that causal interpretations are assigned faster than non-causal alternatives (Sanders 
& Noordman 2000; Louwerse 2001), even though they are acquired later (Bloom et 
al. 1980; Evers-Vermeul 2005). Added evidence for this view comes from the relative 
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preponderance of causal relations produced in a discourse continuation task (Tyler & 
Carlson 2015) and from the frequency of such relations in a large corpus of newspaper text 
with hand-annotated coherence relations (the Penn Discourse Treebank, PDTB; Prasad et 
al. 2008). Notably, the PDTB reveals that explicit connectives are rare for causal relations, 
which may reflect language users’ preference to treat such relations as the default when 
producing and interpreting juxtaposed sentences (Asr & Demberg 2012). In the PDTB, 
implicitness is therefore associated with causal inference, at least for the omission of con-
nectives between sentences. In the conjoined embedded clauses at issue here, it is again 
implicitness that is associated with causal inference, though what is omitted is a comple-
mentizer, not a connective.
Most relevant for the current studies, a number of researchers have noted the ease 
with which the conjunction and invites a causal interpretation when it is used to conjoin 
two propositions (see reviews in Txurruka 2003; Zeevat & Jasinskaja 2007). Bar-Lev and 
Palacas (1980) make a strong claim that the lexical semantics of and itself imposes a 
basic constraint on the temporal/causal ordering of the conjuncts such that the second 
conjunct cannot occur prior to the first. This approach contrasts with more traditional 
analyses (Grice 1975; Schmerling 1975; Gazdar 1979; Posner 1980) in which and has 
an underlying symmetric meaning which undergoes pragmatic enrichment to achieve 
temporal/causal interpretations via the context of use and inferences about cooperative 
communication. In a similar vein, Txurruka (2003) pins the interpretive effects of and 
on its role in enforcing a coordinated discourse structure, distinct from the subordinated 
structures that are possible with sentence juxtaposition.
What is important for our purposes is the recognition of the preference for causal coher-
ence as a backdrop against which to test our manipulations of the presence of a comple-
mentizer. Given the strength of causal biases, it is all the more intriguing how a cue as 
small as that could detract from a default causal interpretation.
2.2 Cues to coherence
Our studies’ manipulation of a lexical cue to guide coherence establishment fits within a 
larger literature that seeks to understand the contextual properties of a discourse that sup-
port the inference of particular coherence relations. Coherence relations can of course be 
signaled explicitly with an overt connective (e.g., because, as a result, similarly, in contrast, 
etc.), though many contexts leave the relation implicit. Moreover, the presence of an overt 
connective is not necessarily sufficient for disambiguation since a number of connectives 
are compatible with more than one relation. A conjunction like and can convey a simple 
additive reading (e.g., Mary likes coffee and she likes tea), but it also is compatible with the 
temporal and causal readings discussed above, as well as with contrastive readings (e.g., 
Mary likes cats and John likes dogs). In such cases, the content of the conjoined sentences 
is crucial for inferring the speaker’s intended relation, and this inferencing depends on 
contextual cues and comprehenders’ real-world knowledge.
Previous work has identified a number of cues that guide the inference of particular 
coherence relations when overt connectives are absent or ambiguous. Within the experi-
mental pragmatics literature, story continuation tasks have been used to assess how cues 
in one sentence influence the relation which holds between that sentence and a subse-
quent sentence that a participant produces. There is evidence that both the type of event 
described in a context sentence and the way that event is described can influence the 
distribution of coherence relations in participant responses. For example, a preference for 
continuations that provide a reason (i.e., a backward causal relation) has been observed 
following sentences with Implicit Causality (IC) verbs, suggesting that the cause of an IC 
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scenario, if unmentioned in prior discourse, is expected to be made explicit in a subsequent 
sentence (Simner & Pickering 2005; Kehler et al. 2008). Compare the  story-continuation 
prompts in (3) and (4).
(3) John congratulated Emma. ___________________________
(4) John babysat Emma. ___________________________
Continuations following (3), which contains the IC verb congratulate, are more likely to 
address the question “Why” than continuations following (4), which contains the non-IC 
verb babysit. Events of congratulation typically have as their cause some praiseworthy 
action on the part of the congratulatee, whereas babysitting events do not appear to 
encode an implicit cause that merits mention to the same degree. In this way, the event 
type influences the identification of a discourse relation. 
More subtly, aspectual marking on the verb itself can shift the distribution of coherence 
relations in participant story continuations. Events described as completed (perfective aspect) 
are shown to favor narrative continuations that tell what happened next, whereas events 
described as ongoing (imperfective aspect) favor continuations that explain or elaborate on 
the event (Kehler et al. 2008; see also Smith 1991 on the distinction between the use of per-
fective and imperfective in narrative text). In a similar vein, Dery and Koenig (2015) report 
that context sentences that represent an event as temporary yield a preference for continu-
ations that move the discourse in time (forward or backward) more than context sentences 
representing an event as permanent. Even the subsequent mention of a particular event par-
ticipant in the prompt can bias the types of continuations participants produce, for example 
disfavoring causal continuations following an IC verb like congratulate if an event participant 
other than the causally implicated congratulatee is mentioned (Kehler & H. Rohde 2017).
Beyond data from behavioral studies, the PDTB offers a large-scale resource for analyz-
ing the distribution of coherence relations and the surface properties that co-occur with 
those relations. For example, computational linguists have tested whether certain features 
occur more frequently when particular relations hold: adverbials like Monday or yesterday 
in temporal relations, lexical items conveying opposite polarity sentiment in relations of 
comparison (John is terrible whereas Mary is wonderful, Pitler et al. 2009), and negation 
in relations related to contrast and alternatives (Webber 2013; Asr & Demberg 2015). 
As a last example, information structural marking can provide another cue that may 
be used for inferring coherence relations. Kehler (2005) argues that different patterns of 
focus marking are associated with different relations in contexts like the one shown in (5). 
In (5), the connective and is ambiguous between at least two readings. The two readings 
differ in what larger discourse question the passage is taken to answer—Who did what to 
whom? (parallel) or What happened and what was the consequence? (result). 
(5) Powell defied Cheney, and Bush punished Powell.
Kehler notes that the parallel interpretation is associated with accent placement on each 
word of the second clause (BUSH PUNISHED POWELL), whereas the result interpretation 
leaves the final word unaccented (BUSH PUNISHED Powell). Focus marking, as indicated 
by prosodic accenting (represented here by the use of all caps), thus influences the inferred 
relation or question under discussion (Roberts 1996; Büring 2004). The manipulation of 
surface form through focus marking has been shown to influence the interpretation of 
other pragmatic phenomena such as coreference, implicature, and projection (Cummins 
& H. Rohde 2015; Simons et al. to appear).
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In these cases, however, the cues themselves convey information that contributes to the 
event-level semantics of who did what to whom (verb class, verb aspect, reference, nega-
tion, focus). The studies presented here crucially manipulate the optional complementizer 
that can appear at the beginning of an embedded clause, a cue that itself carries primarily 
information about structure building and propositional mood (the latter in combination 
with the lexical semantics of the embedding verb). 
2.3 Interpretation of and and its sensitivity to the complementizer that
The conjunction and is often ambiguous, as can be seen in (5) above and here in (6), in 
which the two sentences in (1) are conjoined.
(6) A new mayor was elected and there was a riot.
The two events described in (6) can be interpreted as two unrelated events in a par-
allel or symmetric relation, in which case conjunct reversal is permitted. Under the 
causal interpretation, the two events are connected asymmetrically and the order of 
the conjuncts cannot be reversed. Asymmetric readings of and arise easily and must 
be accounted for, as Gazdar (1979: 168) highlighted with his famous, now rather 
dated, example (Getting married and having a child is better than having a child and 
 getting married; originally from Wilson 1975: 151, with similar examples discussed in 
Cohen 1971). Such readings are typically treated as pragmatic inferences (Grice 1975; 
Schmerling 1975; Posner 1980; Carston 1993). Clauses conjoined with and are said to 
permit the inference of fewer possible relations than two independent sentences that 
are juxtaposed with no connective (e.g., Bar Lev & Palacas 1980). This means that 
there are only a few possible relations under consideration in the conjoined contexts 
of interest here. For our purposes, the relevant ones are those in which (i) the event 
described in the first clause caused the event described in the second, and hence fol-
lowed the first temporally (forward causality) or (ii) the two events are unordered 
temporally and stand in no causal relation (parallel). In addition, we will consider an 
alternative causal interpretation whereby the event described in a second clause is 
not the result but the explanation of the first (backward causality, see Carston 1993; 
 Wilson & Sperber 1998).
Conjoined clauses can be embedded, as in (2), repeated here as (7). The presence of the 
complementizer that is optional, and its presence or absence before the second conjunct 
appears to influence the interpretation of the relation that holds between the two embed-
ded clauses. 
(7) a. The newspaper reported that a new mayor was elected and there was a riot.
b. The newspaper reported that a new mayor was elected and that there was a riot.
Bjorkman provides a syntactic analysis for why the presence of an additional comple-
mentizer (as in (7b)) would favor a non-causal interpretation and its absence (as in (7a)) 
would favor a (forward) causal interpretation. In her terms, the embedded clauses in (7a) 
are ambiguous between complementizer phrase (CP) and tense phrase (TP) coordination 
whereas (7b) is unambiguously CP coordination, the more complex and larger syntactic 
structure. See (8) for a bracketed illustration of the syntactic difference, with (8a) indi-
cating the more economical conjoined TP structure that is possible in the absence of the 
second complementizer. However, the more complex structure in (8b) can also be built 
even when the complementizer is not present.
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(8) a. The newspaper reported [CP that [TP the mayor was elected] and [TP there 
was a riot]].
b. The newspaper reported [CP that [TP the mayor was elected]] and [CP (that) 
[TP there was a riot]].
Bjorkman states that “asymmetric [causal] interpretations are available only to TP coordi-
nation, while logical [non-causal] interpretations are available only to CP coordination, at 
least in embedded contexts” (2010: 12–13). She presents cross-linguistic data indicating 
a correlation between the presence/absence of the complementizer and the availability 
of a causal interpretation. In a psycholinguistic follow-up to Bjorkman’s analysis of CP 
versus TP coordination, Thompson, Collado-Isasi, Omana and Yousuf (2012) measured 
processing difficulty associated with logical, temporal, and causal interpretations of and 
in non-embedded contexts. They had participants read a sentence one word at a time and 
then timed participants’ subsequent production of that same sentence. Sentences convey-
ing logical conjunction (Gabriel ordered the pasta and Lily had some chicken) yielded longer 
production times compared to sentences conveying temporal or causal meanings (She 
won the lottery and they bought a yacht; A hurricane hit and the schools closed). They take 
these findings as support for Bjorkman’s claim that logical conjunction requires the more 
complex CP structure, whereas asymmetric interpretations use the less complex TP struc-
ture. The results are also in keeping with the generalization reviewed earlier that causal 
 interpretation facilitates processing.
There is a separate line of research on optional complementizers in the sentence pro-
cessing literature, which focuses on simpler structures consisting of a single complement 
clause or a relative clause (e.g., Ferreira & Dell 2000; Roland, Elman & Ferreira 2006; 
Torres Cacoullos & Walker 2009; Jaeger 2010; Wasow, Jaeger & Orr 2011). Although 
that work explores biases in the production of that rather than its interpretive effects, the 
findings nevertheless can help contextualize our studies. That prior work assessed local 
syntactic and semantic factors that predict that omission in single embedded complement 
clauses (e.g., I think (that) you must go). In a corpus analysis of optional that, Jaeger (2010) 
compares multiple factors that are posited to predict a speaker’s choice to include or omit 
the optional complementizer. He finds that the most influential predictor is the informa-
tion density of the material at the onset of the verb’s complement. For example, that is 
more likely to be present if the embedding verb does not typically take a complement 
clause, meaning that the presence of the complementizer may be used in part to herald 
an atypical structure. The verb worry, which rarely takes a complement clause, had the 
highest that-bias; the verb guess, which nearly always takes a complement clause, had the 
lowest that-bias. In other words, when the syntactic structure is the default for a particular 
verb, omission of that increases in production. In the studies reported here we ask whether 
that omission is associated with the inference of a default coherence relation, though in 
our cases, the complementizer that is at stake is the one that can appear on the second of 
two conjoined embedded clauses. 
In sum, the inference of causal connections has been argued to function as a common 
default in language processing. Causal coherence relations can be lexically cued, and 
when they are not, recourse is made to world knowledge and the content of clauses to 
explain perceptions of causal coherence. This paper explores whether a new source of 
information, the surface cue of an optional complementizer before the second of two 
conjoined embedded clauses, may affect interpretations of causal coherence, and explores 
how such effects can be explained. We specifically test whether psycholinguistic judg-
ments of meaning and felicity are sensitive to this interaction between surface form and 
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discourse coherence. This work is an opportunity to test whether Bjorkman’s predictions, 
which make only limited allowance for gradience, are upheld in participant judgments.
3 Experiment 1 (rating scale)
To test the role of the complementizer on causal inference, this first study presented par-
ticipants with sentences containing two embedded clauses, with or without an optional 
complementizer before the second of the two clauses (analogous to (6) and (7)). Partici-
pants’ ratings of the causal connection between the two clauses allow us to test whether 
the presence of that blocks the causal interpretaton.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Materials 
The study consisted of 32 target sentences along with 20 fillers. A sample item is shown 
in (9) (for all target sentences, see Appendix A). 
(9) a. During the class observation, the professor noted that the student 
teacher did not look confident and the students were poorly behaved. 
 [complementizer absent]
b. During the class observation, the professor noted that the student  teacher 
did not look confident and that the students were poorly behaved. 
 [complementizer present]
Target sentences used a variety of embedding verbs (e.g., announced, claimed, remarked, 
feared, etc.). The two events described in the embedded clauses were selected to allow for 
the possibility that the first could reasonably have caused the second but need not have. 
We attempted to avoid pairs of events whose causal link would already be at ceiling given 
world knowledge, with the construction of the items being based on our own intuitions 
about the events. We manipulated the presence/absence of a complementizer that before 
the second embedded clause. Most items began with a prepositional phrase that was 
designed to give more context and to improve the plausibility of a non-causal reading: for 
example, in (9), class observations are taken to be situations that could plausibly yield a 
list of non-causally-related comments about the classroom.
Of the 20 fillers, 10 were unambiguous catch trials, such that a participant’s poor per-
formance on them would indicate lack of attention or a misunderstanding of the task. 
Causality was manipulated within these 10 fillers such that each participant saw 5 in the 
unambiguously causal condition (marked with the discourse marker because) and 5 in the 
unambiguously non-causal condition (marked with despite or unrelated to; see Appendix 
C), as in (10).
(10) a. At the community swimming pool, the lifeguard Kyle reprimanded Sally 
because she was biting someone. [causal]
b. At the community swimming pool, the lifeguard Kyle reprimanded Sally 
unrelated to her biting someone. [non-causal]
A further 10 fillers manipulated the IC/non-IC status of the verb (see Appendix D) and 
were included to test whether participants would indeed favor a causal interpretation in 
IC contexts, as has been shown in previous work, and furthermore whether they would do 
so even when an existing causal connection could be inferred to hold between subsenten-
tial elements. For example, in (11), a causal connection may hold between Sheila’s  lecture 
and the intern’s texting (see Webber 1991; Kehler & H. Rohde 2015; Kehler & Cohen 
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submitted). Verb class was manipulated within items for these 10 fillers; each participant 
saw 5 IC and 5 non-IC sentences.
(11) a. During a business conference, the manager Sheila lectured the texting intern 
Kevin. [IC]
b. During a business conference, the manager Sheila introduced the texting 
intern Kevin. [non-IC]
3.1.2 Participants 
Forty participants, recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, completed the experi-
ment through a survey on Qualtrics. Two participants were excluded from the analysis 
for assigning higher ratings of causal connection to the unambiguously non-causal filler 
sentences than the unambiguously causal filler sentences. One non-native speaker of Eng-
lish was also excluded. The results represent the data from the remaining 37 participants. 
The research was registered with the University of Edinburgh’s Linguistics and English 
Language ethics review board.
3.1.3 Procedure 
Before starting the survey, participants were familiarized with the type of sentences they 
would be rating with a practice sentence like (12a) or (12b). Whether participants saw a 
practice sentence with or without the complementizer was randomized. While not discuss-
ing the optionality of the complementizer, the instructions did note the possible causal 
connection between the two embedded clauses (yelling could lead to a missed free throw 
but need not). 
(12) a. At the basketball game, the referee observed that a fan screamed from the 
bleachers and the star player missed his free throw. [complementizer 
absent]
b. At the basketball game, the referee observed that a fan screamed from the 
bleachers and that the star player missed his free throw. [complementizer 
present]
This familiarization was intended to help reduce competition from the alternative inter-
pretation in the complementizer-absent condition whereby only one clause is embedded 
and the second is an independent clause (i.e., for (12a), the referee observed the yelling 
and then subsequently the star player missed the free throw). In that structure, the con-
junction and in (12a) joins the statement about the referee’s observation with the state-
ment about the star player’s missed throw, two events that are less likely to be causally 
linked than the yelling and the missed throw. If participants frequently assign the alterna-
tive structure, this would serve only to reduce our ability to see the predicted effect: the 
complementizer-absent condition is predicted to yield higher causal ratings, but if par-
ticipants favor the alternative structure when the complementizer is absent, their causal 
ratings would likely go down.
The 32 target sentences and 20 fillers were presented in a random order. After each sen-
tence, participants were asked to rate the causal connection between two parts of the sen-
tence on a 1–5 scale (from definitely not causally related to definitely causally related). 
For a target sentence like (9), they would be asked how likely it is that the students’ poor 
behavior was caused by the student teacher not looking confident. For a catch trial like 
(10), they would be asked how likely it is that the lifeguard reprimanded Sally because 
of her biting. For an IC filler sentence like (11), they would be asked how likely it is that 
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Sheila’s lecture was caused by Kevin’s texting (or in the non-IC condition, how likely it 
is that Sheila’s introduction was caused by Kevin’s texting). Each sentence and question 
pair appeared on a screen by itself, and participants had to choose a rating to advance to 
the next item.
3.2 Results and discussion
Participants’ ratings were modeled with a cumulative linear mixed model using the clmm 
function in the ordinal package (Christensen 2015) in R (R Development Core Team 
2015). The model of the target items contained a fixed effect for complementizer presence 
and random intercepts and slopes by participant and item, the maximal random effects 
structure (Barr et al. 2013). Model comparison was used to test for a difference in the 
likelihood of the data under a model with or without the fixed effect of complementizer. 
Analyses of the filler items were conducted similarly, substituting a fixed effect of filler 
type for complementizer.
The ratings on the unambiguous filler items confirm that the 37 participants we included 
in the main analysis paid attention to the task and understood the direction of the rating 
scale: unambiguously causal fillers received higher causal ratings (4.70) than unambiguously 
non-causal fillers (2.55), and model comparison confirmed that causality ratings were better 
captured by a model containing a factor for discourse marker because-vs-despite (ß = –5.17, 
p < 0.001). In the subset of the fillers in which we varied verb type, the presence of an IC 
verb yielded higher causal ratings (4.14) than a non-IC verb (2.61); model comparison con-
firmed that verb class was a significant predictor of ratings (ß = –2.98, p < 0.001). This 
suggests that participants were paying attention to causality in the expected manner.
The data for the target items consists of 1,184 judgments (no questions skipped; all par-
ticipants completed the task). In accordance with Bjorkman’s predictions that an optional 
complementizer can block causal interpretations, sentences with the optional comple-
mentizer present received lower mean causality scores (3.08) than sentences without the 
optional complementizer (3.21). Complementizer presence was found to be a significant 
predictor of causality ratings (ß = 0.13, p < 0.05). 
Given the subtlety of the rating difference between the two conditions, Experiment 2 
used a different methodology (a forced-choice task) to test how highlighting the pres-
ence/absence of the complementizer may influence causal interpretation. It has been 
argued that rating tasks are most appropriate when effect size is what is of interest, 
whereas forced-choice tasks are better at detecting qualitative differences between condi-
tions (Schütze & Sprouse 2014). Our tested prediction can best be understood as a qualita-
tive distinction: for a given target sentence, the participant must decide whether the two 
described events are causally linked or whether they occurred independently. Participants’ 
estimates of which scenario is at play may be graded, but the two scenarios themselves are 
fully distinct; the two events in the world cannot have both a causal relationship and an 
independent relationship since the two are mutually exclusive. Experiment 2 draws atten-
tion to the two real-world scenarios and two linguistic formulations that could be used to 
describe such scenarios.
4 Experiment 2 (forced choice)
This study again contained target sentences in which the descriptions of two events 
appear as conjoined embedded clauses. However, in this study participants were pre-
sented with both the complementizer-absent and complementizer-present variants of each 
target item and asked to choose which variant conveys a specific meaning. The predic-
tions, based on Bjorkman’s claims and the results of Experiment 1, are that participants 
will select the variant without the complementizer when asked which version conveys a 
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causal  relationship between events and will select the variant with the complementizer 
when asked which version conveys that the events are unrelated. 
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Materials 
This study consisted of 28 target sentences (see Appendix B). The target items were adapted 
from Experiment 1, with the elimination of partially overlapping sentences and the stand-
ardization of the presence of an initial prepositional phrase across all sentences. Each tar-
get item was presented as a pair of sentences varying only in the presence/absence of the 
complementizer. The 10 unambiguous catch trials were also adapted from Experiment 1, 
with the non-causal condition edited to use only the discourse marker unrelated to. Each 
catch trial was presented as a pair of sentences: the unambiguously causal condition (with 
because) and the unambiguously non-causal condition (with unrelated to). The 10 IC fillers 
were adapted from Experiment 1, with the non-IC verbs eliminated and with the modifier 
appearing either as a prenominal adjective (the texting intern, as in Experiment 1) or as a 
relative clause (the intern who was texting) to test whether an integrated pre-nominal adjec-
tive is perceived as more causally linked than the post-nominal clause. Each IC filler trial 
was presented as a pair of sentences: the variant with the post-nominal relative clause and 
the variant with the pre-nominal adjective.
4.1.2 Participants 
Forty-two participants, recruited through Mechanical Turk, completed the experiment 
through a survey on Qualtrics. All participants were native speakers of English. Five 
 participants were excluded from the analysis for more than one incorrect answer on the 
unambiguous filler sentences. The results are from the remaining 37 participants. The 
research was approved by the Morehead State University Institutional Review Board for 
the Protection of Human Subjects (IRB), protocol 11-09-12R7.
4.1.3 Procedure 
Before starting the survey, participants were shown the paired examples in (12) and the 
causal and non-causal interpretations were noted. They were then told they would be 
asked to select which version they preferred in response to a question about the sentence 
meaning, as in (13). Whether they saw a practice question about causality or  non-causality 
was randomized. 
(13) a. Which of the two sentences is more likely to mean that the fan screaming 
from the bleachers caused the star player to miss his free throw? [causal 
question]
b. Which of the two sentences is more likely to mean that the fan screaming 
from the bleachers and the star player missing his free throw were unre-
lated? [non-causal question]
For the main experiment, each item was presented as a pair of sentences with a question. 
Whether participants were asked about causality or unrelatedness on a given item was 
counterbalanced within-participants, and the order of the 48 questions was randomized 
for each participant. 
4.2 Results and discussion
We modeled the binary choice of sentence selection with a logistic mixed effects model 
using the lmer function in the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler & Bolker 2013) in R (R 
Development Core Team 2015). The model of the target items contained a fixed effect 
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for question type and random intercepts and slopes by participant and item, the maximal 
random effects structure (Barr et al. 2013). Model comparison was used to test for a dif-
ference in the likelihood of the data under a model with or without the fixed effect of 
question type. Analyses of the filler items were conducted similarly, substituting a fixed 
effect of filler type for question type.
As in Experiment 1, the catch trials confirm that the 37 participants we include in the 
main analysis paid attention to the task and understood the questions: the unambiguously 
causal variant with because was chosen when the question asked about one event caus-
ing the other (100% of the time); the unambiguously non-causal variant with unrelated 
to was chosen when the question asked about unrelated events (99.5% of the time). For 
the IC fillers, the variant with pre-nominal modification was selected more often (65.4% 
of the time) when the question asked about one event causing the other; the variant with 
the post-nominal relative clause was selected more often (64.9% of the time) when the 
question asked about unrelated events. Results show that question type is a significant 
predictor of preferred modification position (ß = 1.77, p < 0.005).
The data for the target items consists of the full 1,036 responses. The results showed 
a strong effect of the complementizer on causal interpretation, whereby question type 
was found to be a significant predictor of preferred sentence (ß = 4.40, p < 0.001): in 
response to questions asking participants to select the sentence that is more likely to con-
tain causally related propositions, participants preferred the sentence without the second 
complementizer 79% of the time. Conversely, in response to questions asking for the 
sentence that is more likely to contain unrelated propositions, participants preferred the 
sentence with the second complementizer present 80% of the time. See Table 1.
Experiments 1 and 2 provide evidence that an optional complementizer reduces the 
perception of causal coherence between embedded clauses and does so especially strongly 
with a forced-choice methodology. The target sentences used in both studies all contained 
pairs of embedded clauses designed to be ambiguous between causal and non-causal 
interpretations. In cases of and-conjunction, causal inferences (almost) always involve the 
first clause describing the cause of the second: a forward causal relationship. Txurruka 
(2003) gives an account in which and permits coordinating discourse relations but not 
subordinating relations like that conveyed by because. However, an alternative reverse 
causal relationship is occasionally possible whereby the second clause describes the cause 
of the first, as shown in the following example from Larry Horn (cited in Carston 1993). 
(14) A: Did John break the glass? 
B: Well, the glass broke and John dropped it.
If optional complementizers really do reduce causal interpretation, then an additional pre-
diction is that clauses whose propositional content suggests a reverse causal relationship 
should be more acceptable with the extra complementizer present than without it. That is, 
if the default interpretation of and-conjoined clauses is to infer forward causality (where 
the first clause causes the second) and if the optional complementizer reduces this infer-
Which of the two sentences below 
is more likely to mean that…
the student teacher not being 
confident caused the students’ 
poor behavior?
the student teacher not being 
confident and the students’ poor 
behavior were unrelated?
complementizer absent 409 (79%) 106 (20%)
complementizer present 109 (21%) 412 (80%)
Table 1: Results of Experiment 2.
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ence, then cases in which the inference of forward causality is highly  implausible should 
be more acceptable with the optional complementizer (as also observed by  Bjorkman 
2010, 2013, and traced to the TP vs. CP coordination structure). In Experiment 3, we 
test the effect of a complementizer in contexts in which the propositional content of the 
 conjoined clauses favors a reverse causal relationship.
5 Experiment 3: Reverse causality (rating scale)
This study measures the impact of the presence or absence of an optional complementizer 
on the acceptability of sentences with two embedded clauses, where the propositional 
content suggests, or even requires, that the second caused the first. In (15), a forward cau-
sality result relation is easily inferred to hold between the two embedded clauses  (running 
a red light can easily lead to being pulled over). The reverse causality case in (16) sounds 
relatively degraded because people rarely get caught by the police before they do some-
thing illegal.2 
(15) The witness said that Clive ran a red light and the policeman pulled Clive over.
(16) The witness said that the policeman pulled Clive over and Clive ran a red light.
Conjunction with and is often interpreted as conveying that the described events are mov-
ing forward in time. In the case of (16), the propositional content is incompatible with 
such an interpretation (or at least requires more imagination to construct a relevant con-
text). If there were a way (e.g., an optional complementizer) to reduce the inclination to 
infer forward causality in (16), then the sentence is predicted to sound better. Sentences 
(17) and (18) include the complementizer.
(17) The witness said that Clive ran a red light and that the policeman pulled Clive over. 
(18) The witness said that the policeman pulled Clive over and that Clive ran a red light.
Sentence (17) is predicted to sound acceptable if the additional complementizer does not 
fully block the forward causality. Sentence (18) is predicted to sound better than (16) if 
the optional complementizer, as suggested by Experiments 1 and 2, reduces perceptions of 
causality. The optional complementizer in (18) should loosen the expectation of a forward 
causal interpretation, thereby opening up alternative interpretations (e.g., logical con-
junction, reverse causality) and improving acceptability. The effect is predicted to emerge 
as an interaction between order and complementizer. Paralleling the forward causality 
studies, we first report the rating study and then describe a forced-choice variant.
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Materials 
There were 20 target sentences of the types shown in (15–18), varying the order of the 
two embedded clauses and the presence of a complementizer before the second  embedded 
 2 Note that in stand-alone sentences, the forward causality and reverse causality cases are both possible, as 
in (i) and (ii). Illegal driving can result in police action (the inference for (i)) or it can be mentioned as an 
explanation (the inference for (ii)).
(i) Clive ran a red light. The policeman pulled him over. 
(ii) The policeman pulled Clive over. Clive ran a red light.
  It is only when the two clauses are and-conjoined that the reverse causality reading is awkward (Bar-Lev & 
Palacas 1980).
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clause (see Appendix E). The survey contained 80 filler sentences, including 44 items for 
two unrelated experiments. The interleaved experiments contained clefts that varied in 
acceptability and the grammatical case of post-copula pronouns (It was I who completed the 
assignment vs. It was me who completed the assignment vs. It was me whom completed the assign-
ment) and sentences with focus-sensitive particles even and only. The remaining 26 fillers 
used a variety of structures, including several catch trials that were fully ungrammatical 
in order to identify participants who were not paying attention or misunderstood the task. 
5.1.2 Participants 
125 participants were recruited from two universities. Seven were students at Morehead 
State University who responded to a posting for a paid study on a website listing  available 
experiments for students in psychology classes; they received $10 for their participa-
tion. The remaining participants were students at South Georgia State College taking 
introductory English classes who participated in exchange for extra credit.3 The research 
was approved by the South Georgia State College Institutional Review Board and by the 
Morehead State University IRB (protocol 11-09-12R8). Nine participants were excluded 
because they rated at least two ungrammatical filler sentences highly (with a 6 or 7 for 
sentences such as *It was the softball who broke the window). The results are from the 
remaining 116 participants. All were native speakers of English.
5.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were asked to rate on a 1–7 rating scale how natural and acceptable each 
 sentence was, where 1 indicated unnatural/unacceptable and 7 indicated natural and 
acceptable. Sentences were counterbalanced for the presence/absence of the second 
optional complementizer.
5.2 Results and discussion
The analysis here follows the ordinal modeling described in Experiment 1 with fixed 
effects for causal order (forward/reverse), sentence type (with/without the complemen-
tizer), and their interaction, along with random intercepts and slopes by participant and 
item, the maximal random effects structure. The fixed effects were centered via deviation 
coding to ensure that the main effects would be interpretable with the interaction present.
The data from the 116 participants consists of 2,306 ratings (14 cells were empty because 
the participant did not answer the question). Table 2 shows the means for the four condi-
tions. The only significant effect is for sentence type: forward causality sentences were 
rated higher than reverse causality sentences (ß = –1.11, p < 0.001). Aside from that, the 
presence of the complementizer yielded numerically higher ratings (ß = 0.15, p = 0.11), 
with a slightly larger improvement due to the complementizer for reverse causality sen-
tences in keeping with our predictions (p = 0.22).
These results show that participants prefer forward causality, but there is no significant 
evidence that the acceptability of sentences in the reverse causality condition improves 
in the presence of a complementizer. However, Experiment 1 and 2 showed that a small 
 3 The number of participants is large because entire classrooms of students participated. Once professors had 
agreed to allow their students to do the study, questionnaires were provided for all of the students.
Forward causality Reverse causality
Without that 5.06 4.22
With that  5.16 4.41
Table 2: Mean naturalness ratings for items in Experiment 3.
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effect in a rating-scale measure was more apparent in a forced-choice paradigm. It is 
 possible the same could be true for reverse causality sentences. Experiment 4a tested this, 
using a forced-choice methodology to assess the effect of an optional complementizer on 
the acceptability of reverse causality sentences.
6 Experiment 4a: Reverse causality (forced choice ratings)
This study presented participants with both the complementizer-absent and complemen-
tizer-present variants of each target item and asked them to select which variant sounds 
better. If complementizer presence favors reverse causality more than forward causality, 
participants’ selections are predicted to vary with the causal order. Given the numeric pat-
tern of the Experiment 3 rating results, we predict a preference for sentences conveying 
forward causality and those that contain a complementizer. 
6.1 Method
6.1.1 Materials
Each item consisted of a question prompt followed by a pair of candidate sentences. For 
the 20 target items, the question prompt was Which sentence sounds better to you? The pair 
of candidate sentences differed in the presence/absence of the complementizer but kept 
causal order constant as in (19a–b) and (20a–b). The candidate sentences were the same 
as in Experiment 3 (see Appendix E). 
(19) Forward-causality
a. The witness said that Clive ran a red light and the policeman pulled Clive 
over. [complementizer absent]
b. The witness said that Clive ran a red light and that the policeman pulled 
Clive over. [complementizer present]
(20) Reverse-causality
a. The witness said that the policeman pulled Clive over and Clive ran a red 
light. [complementizer absent]
b. The witness said that the policeman pulled Clive over and that Clive ran a 
red light. [complementizer present]
The study also contained 18 items for an unrelated experiment on ellipsis ambiguity (e.g. Mika 
wanted to bake muffins before Leah did). For those items, the prompt included the  ambiguous 
sentence followed by the question Which is true? The pair of candidate sentences identified two 
possible interpretations (e.g., Mika wanted to bake muffins before Leah wanted to bake  muffins; 
Mika wanted to bake muffins before Leah baked muffins). A further 35 fillers showed a sentence 
and asked an interpretation question (if the sentence was ambiguous) or a comprehension 
question (if the sentence was unambiguous), such as Who did what? or What  happened? 
6.1.2 Participants
We recruited 31 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk who completed the exper-
iment through a survey on Qualtrics. All participants were native speakers of English and 
none were excluded. The research was approved by the Morehead State University IRB 
(protocol 11-09-12R8).
6.1.3 Procedure 
For each item, participants answered the prompt question by selecting one of the two 
candidate sentences. For target items, we counterbalanced causal order.
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6.2 Results and discussion 
The binary outcome of sentence choice was modeled using a logistic mixed-effects model 
with a fixed effect of causal order and random intercepts and slopes for participant and 
item (the maximal random effects structure). 
The data from the 31 participants consisted of 620 responses. Table 3 shows the 
selected sentence type (absence/presence of that) for the forward and reverse causality 
orders.
As predicted, causal order was a significant predictor of sentence selection (ß = 2.05, 
p < 0.001): in the forward-causality condition, participants preferred the version 
with that 60% of the time, and, as predicted, in the reverse-causality condition that 
 preference increased to 84%. It seems that when events constrain causal order so that 
the second clause is most easily interpreted as the cause of the first, there is a stronger 
preference for a sentence form that includes the optional complementizer. The pres-
ence of the complementizer biases away from a forward causal interpretation and 
the absence of the complementizer strengthens the preference for a forward causal 
interpretation. 
7 Experiment 4b: Reverse causality (interpretation)
In Experiment 4a, we asked participants to rate sentences with forward or reverse cau-
sality orders, comparing items with and without that. However, we merely asked which 
sentences they preferred, not what interpretation they formed for the sentences. It is pos-
sible, therefore, that participants did not draw the conclusion of reverse causality, and 
instead may have accepted the embedded clauses as simply discussing two independent 
events that occurred. Because of that gap, we carried out an additional study using the 
reverse causality items from Experiment 4a and we explicitly probed the reverse causality 
meaning.
7.1 Method
7.1.1 Materials 
Each item consisted of a sentence followed by a question asking whether the reverse 
causality meaning was possible. The 20 target sentences were the reverse-causality sen-
tences from Experiment 4a (see Appendix E) and appeared either with or without the 
second complementizer, as in (21a–b). The questions were yes/no questions asking if the 
second conjoined embedded clause could have caused the first, as in (21c). A positive 
response yes signaled that the participant endorsed the possibility of the reverse-causality 
 interpretation.
(21) Reverse-causality
a. The witness said that the policeman pulled Clive over and Clive ran a red 
light. [complementizer absent]
b. The witness said that the policeman pulled Clive over and that Clive ran a 
red light. [complementizer present]
c. Can this sentence express the meaning where Clive running a red light 
caused the policeman to pull him over? Yes/No.
Forward causality Reverse causality
Without that 123 (40%) 51 (16%)
With that  186 (60%) 259 (84%)
Table 3: Participants’ selections in forward and reverse causality contexts in Experiment 4a.
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In order to provide some variety and a point of comparison, 6 targeted fillers were created 
which contained embedded clauses only compatible with a forward causality relation-
ship, as in (22a). Three of these contained two complementizers and three had only the 
first complementizer.
(22) Forward-causality fillers
a. The news anchor stated that the flooding was severe and that residents were 
advised to evacuate the area.
b. Can this sentence express the meaning where residents being advised to 
evacuate caused the severe flooding? Yes/No.
These fillers were also followed by questions asking if the second clause could have caused 
the first, as in (22b). 
The study contained 18 items for an unrelated experiment on attachment ambiguity 
(e.g., It’s the box on the bookcase with ivory inlay). For those items, the prompt was a 
yes/no question about the high attachment or low attachment interpretation (Does this 
refer to a box with ivory inlay?). A set of 10–13 fillers, depending on the list, contained 
short sentences with only before the verb or the object (The engineer (only) repaired (only) 
a machine) and asked participants to rate the naturalness of the sentences on a 1–7 scale. 
A further 33–36 fillers showed a sentence and asked an interpretation question (if the 
sentence was ambiguous) or asked participants to complete the sentence (if it was incom-
plete), for a total of 90 items per list. There were two lists of items, pseudorandomized 
such that no consecutive items were of the same sub-type or condition. 
7.1.2 Participants
We recruited 45 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk who completed the exper-
iment through a survey on Qualtrics for a payment of $3.75. All participants reported 
being native speakers of English. The responses to 22 unambiguous filler questions 
were examined, and any participant with less than 90% accuracy on these items was 
 eliminated. An additional participant was eliminated. An additional subject was removed 
due to responses that indicated acceptance of the 6 forward-causality filler sentences as 
 conveying reverse causality. This left a total of 41 participants. The research was approved 
by the Morehead State University IRB (protocol 11-09-12R8).
7.1.3 Procedure 
For each item, participants answered the prompt question by choosing yes or no answers. 
For target items, we counterbalanced items with and without that, so that each participant 
saw an equal number of items in each condition and no items more than once.
7.2 Results and discussion 
The reverse-causality sentences with that showed 73% positive answers (endorsing the 
reverse-causality interpretation), and sentences without that received 67% positive 
answers. The binary outcome of accepting a reverse-causality interpretation was modeled 
using a logistic mixed-effects model with a fixed effect of presence of that and random 
intercepts and slopes for participant and item (the maximal random effects structure). 
This analysis showed that the additional that significantly increased reverse-causal inter-
pretations (ß = 0.64, p < 0.05).
In an additional analysis, we compared responses to the 20 reverse-causal items with the 
responses to the 6 forward-causal fillers. As expected, the forward-causal fillers received an 
average of only 20% positive answers to the reverse-causal question. The binary outcome 
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of accepting a reverse-causality interpretation was modeled using a logistic mixed-effects 
model with a fixed effect of sentence type (reverse or forward causal) and random inter-
cepts and slopes for participant and item (the maximal random effects structure). This 
analysis showed a significant effect of sentence type, with the reverse-causal sentences 
receiving more reverse-causal interpretations (ß = 3.42, p < 0.001).
In summary, this study shows that the experimental sentences from Experiments 4a–b 
can readily be interpreted with the last embedded clause causing the first embedded 
clause, and that this interpretation is even more likely with the second that present. The 
sentences are also shown to be more likely to receive the reverse-causal interpretation 
than sentences in which the forward-causal relationship was more sensible. This supports 
our contention that the rating results in Experiment 4a can be taken to bear on the avail-
ability of reverse-causal interpretations.
8 Additional studies
In addition to the five studies discussed above, we also conducted four other studies that 
showed mixed results. We report the results from these pilots and replications in the 
interest of full disclosure about the prospects of replication, as it seems disingenuous to 
report only our positive results. In two smaller rating studies similar to Experiment 1, 
the first showed no effect of the complementizer (ß = 0.22, p = 0.30) and the second 
showed a significant effect in the predicted direction (ß = 1.05, p = 0.03). The first study 
(n = 40) used twenty-two ambiguous sentences like in Experiment 1, including sentences 
2–15 in Appendix A and eight others. The second study (n = 22) used the same materi-
als but showed the complementizer in boldface, to test whether making the complemen-
tizer’s presence more noticeable increased comprehender sensitivity to it. Both of these 
pilot studies presented all sentences, without fillers, in one large table, which may have 
allowed participants to compare items to each other and hence made the task itself more 
meta-linguistic. A third study (n = 42), intended as a simple replication of Experiment 
1 with a slightly modified set of stimuli (see Appendix B), failed to show an effect of the 
complementizer on causality judgments. The data trended in the predicted direction but 
complementizer presence was not a significant predictor of ratings (ß = 0.16, p = 0.19). 
This set of studies, then, suggests that the effect of a complementizer on causal inferences 
is subtle and can be quite sensitive to small changes in procedure.
Lastly, one other experiment was conducted that used a more indirect, less metalinguis-
tic means of assessing causal interpretation, asking participants to consider the counter-
factual: if the first embedded proposition had not occurred, would the second proposition 
still have occurred? If a participant interprets the first proposition as causing the second, 
then a claim about the first not having happened should entail that the second is no 
longer guaranteed to have happened either. But if the embedded clauses are interpreted 
non-causally, then canceling the first would have no impact on the second. Participants 
(n = 42) read the twenty-eight target sentences and thirty fillers from Experiment 1, 
including ten unambiguous (non-)causal sentences, ten temporal items and ten IC sen-
tences. They were asked a question like (23) and rated their agreement on a rating scale 
(from definitely not – definitely yes).
(23) Do you think there would have been a riot if the mayor hadn’t been elected?
The results showed no effect of the optional complementizer (p = 0.32), whereas entirely 
unambiguous cues (because, unrelated to) in the filler sentences showed a strong effect 
(p < 0.001). This alternative measure was therefore clearly sensitive to causality, but did 
not detect an effect of the complementizer in the target items. 
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The results reported for Experiments 1 and 2, combined with the pilots and replication 
attempts listed here, illustrate the subtlety of the complementizer effect and its sensitivity 
to methodology. As noted earlier, we follow Schütze & Sprouse’s (2014) suggestion that 
experimental tasks like ratings on a Likert scale may not yield enough power to see small 
effects, whereas forced-choice studies can detect small differences but may magnify the 
effects. We take the forced-choice results, with their 80% vs. 20% choices in Experiment 2, 
for example, to indicate that the effect of a complementizer on causal inferences is real, 
but not that it is a huge effect. The events we described in our materials, particularly for 
the forward-causality studies, were designed to be not too tightly causally linked, precisely 
because we wanted to allow for the availability of the symmetric non-causal connection. 
In many contexts, comprehenders’ real-world knowledge enforces a causal reading on its 
own, so in order to see if the complementizer could have an effect, we needed these more 
loosely linked events. However, the looser connections may have made it more difficult 
for participants to have strong intuitions about the connections between these events. In 
this way, our studies required connections that simultaneously were sufficiently loose to 
permit multiple interpretations but were not so loose as to be incoherent. Our ability to 
see the effects of complementizers may have therefore depended on finding that delicate 
balance. 
9 General discussion and conclusions
The studies presented here show that the presence of a complementizer preceding the 
second of two embedded clauses affects the perception of causal connection between the 
embedded clauses. Experiments 1 and 2 show that the optional complementizer in for-
ward causality contexts helps reduce the perception that the event described in the first 
embedded clause caused the event described in the second. Experiments 3 and 4 show 
that a complementizer in reverse causality contexts improves naturalness, presumably 
because a weakening of a forward causal relationship is helpful in these contexts. Interest-
ingly, Experiment 4b shows that backward causal relationships can arise between clauses 
joined by and, counter to the strongest interpretation of a claim by Bar-Lev and Palacas 
(1980). These results demonstrate that a word which functions as a syntactic cue to an 
embedded clause without contributing much semantic content can affect perceptions of 
causal coherence between clauses, highlighting the importance of taking surface syntactic 
cues into account in models of discourse coherence. The effect is not large, and is espe-
cially difficult to detect using naturalness ratings, but the fact that it affects both forward 
and backward causality relationships between clauses in a consistent manner leads us to 
believe that it is genuine. 
9.1 Re-evaluating Bjorkman
The results of the main studies reported here provide support for some of Bjorkman’s 
(2010, 2013) syntactic observations. Specifically, her contention that coordination of 
unambiguous CPs (i.e., with the complementizer present) should reduce perceptions of 
forward causality compared to coordination of TPs is supported by Experiments 1 and 
2. However, her papers leave the impression that CP coordination should be unambigu-
ous: she states that the CP coordination should obligatorily convey a symmetric, non-
causal interpretation. There should be interpretive ambiguity only when the coordination 
is structurally ambiguous between CP or TP coordination (i.e., without the complemen-
tizer). But our results do not show an effect of that strength. Rather, the presence of the 
second complementizer serves only to reduce the causal bias but not eliminate it entirely. 
Our results are a reminder that the interpretation a comprehender assigns likely reflects 
a probabilistic combination of syntactic cues and event-level reasoning, and models of 
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language processing must account for probabilistic biases while still explaining how a 
comprehender arrives at a final interpretation of a given utterance.
Instead, the effect of a complementizer on causal interpretation is subtle enough to be 
elusive when targeted by simple causality ratings. The effects are strongest when partici-
pants are asked to draw a direct comparison between the two possible ways to express the 
sentence, as in the forced-choice paradigm. This paradigm focuses attention on the differ-
ence between the sentences (which may be similar to the effect achieved in the pilot study 
in which the complementizer was shown in boldface type), and involves a meta-linguistic 
judgment as well. This suggests that both CP and TP coordinations of clauses are consist-
ent with causal relationships between clauses, and that there is only a weakening (not an 
elimination) of the causal interpretation when the CP is the only structure possible. 
Nonetheless, if either CP or TP coordination is compatible with both interpretations, as 
our results suggest, then we still need to explain why the complementizer affects forward 
causal judgments at all. One possibility is a probabilistic processing approach based on the 
syntactic difference suggested by Bjorkman. Specifically, when the two embedded clauses 
are possibly contained within the same CP (without the second complementizer), they are 
syntactically linked more closely than when they occupy separate CPs, and one natural 
way of relating the linked clauses is by forming a cause-effect relationship (e.g., Sanders 
2005 and causality by default). The second optional complementizer, on the other hand, 
separates the clauses syntactically and highlights the fact that both clauses link back to 
the earlier embedding verb. This highlighting of the connection to the embedding verb 
could correspond to a relative de-emphasizing of the connection to the first embedded 
clause. And it is this increased emphasis on the embedding relation, not only the specific 
syntax of CP coordination, that may lead to fewer participant inferences of causality and 
more interpretations on which the two embedded clauses report two equal but separate 
events. Additionally, the repetition of that may facilitate reactivation of the embedding 
verb. A follow-up experiment to substantiate this explanation could explore whether the 
verb is reactivated following that when it is present, and whether this reactivation is later 
and weaker without the optional complementizer.
Turning to production, one can consider our results in relation to the literature on 
speakers’ inclusion or omission of optional that in simpler sentences (e.g., Jaeger 2010). 
That literature has found that the inclusion of that depends on factors such as informa-
tion density, the accessibility and frequency of the subject of the complement clause, and 
the amount of material between the matrix verb and the complement clause. In simpler 
sentences with only a single embedded clause, more predictable or accessible complement 
clauses are less likely to be marked by that. Our own findings can be interpreted analo-
gously in that a pair of embedded clauses which are more tightly linked to each other 
(i.e., causally connected) are less likely to be marked by that on the second conjunct. If 
causality and complementizers do interact in comprehension in the ways demonstrated 
here, one prediction is that a manipulation of causality ought to affect speakers’ produc-
tion preferences as well. Our results suggest that a speaker’s intention to convey a causal 
connection could act, along with other factors listed above, to decrease production of the 
complementizer that before the second conjoined clause.
9.2 Alternative analyses and predictions
Another possible explanation for our results is an iconic one, whereby parallelism in 
surface form cues symmetric (i.e., non-causal) interpretation. That is, when both embed-
ded clauses are introduced with a complementizer, they are introduced with the same 
overt material. When the second complementizer is omitted, then there is an asymmetry 
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in how the two clauses are introduced, and this asymmetry may perhaps be mapped 
iconically onto an asymmetric (i.e., causal) interpretation. This explanation also makes 
an explicit prediction: omitting a complementizer before the first embedded clause but 
including a complementizer before the second creates an asymmetry that should favor 
asymmetric (i.e. causal) interpretations. If the mechanism for the complementizer effect 
depends on the parallelism between the two embedded clauses, then the omission of the 
first complementizer but the inclusion of the second, as in (24), should increase causal 
interpretation. 
(24) The newspaper reported the mayor was elected and that there was a riot.
Unfortunately, testing this prediction is difficult because removing the first complemen-
tizer but including the second may be dispreferred, particularly if a verb like report favors 
an overt that (though cf. Staum & Sag 2007 on multiple that as a facilitator of another 
construction). Any effect of the complementizer on perceived causality in (24) may be 
obscured by this fact. We would be inclined to mark the sentence as ungrammatical, but 
this is an empirical question.
Under an iconicity account, a more compact expression ought to favor a smaller concep-
tual distance between the components of that expression, in our case yielding the closer 
causal link between events mentioned in two embedded clauses when the second com-
plementizer is omitted. Haiman (1985) discusses this link between form and meaning. 
He observes that linguistic formulations that put constituents closer together also yield 
more closely linked interpretations. Under a rational principle of least effort or economy, 
closely linked concepts yield smaller expressions. One example in this vein comes from 
the language Warekena, which expresses an “inalienable” relationship with fewer markers 
than an alienable one: Aikhenvald (2012) reports that Warekena uses a prefix to express 
inalienable possession (e.g., your voice), whereas a combination of a pronominal prefix 
and a possessive suffix are required for alienable possession (e.g., your canoe). In this 
way, linguistic reduction favors conceptual closeness whereas linguistic expansion favors 
conceptual distance. The iconic account makes another prediction: if another element 
besides the complementizer could be inserted before the second conjoined clause without 
its semantics favoring a particular coherence relation, this element should also reduce 
forward causal connections between the clauses. In auditory experiments, the presence 
or size of a prosodic boundary between two conjoined embedded clauses should similarly 
reduce forward causal inferences. 
Lastly, we return to the role of implicature in deriving causal readings in these con-
texts. A pragmatic account posits that the semantic meaning of and as logical conjunc-
tion undergoes pragmatic enrichment by way of Grice’s (1975) maxim of Manner. 
If cooperative speakers are expected to “be orderly” in their presentation of tempo-
rally sequenced events, then listeners can rightly infer that an event described in the 
first conjunct likely preceded an event described in the second conjunct. The maxim 
of Manner likewise imposes an expectation for brevity. This underlies the observation 
that unmarked, briefer forms are used to convey unmarked, stereotypical meanings, 
whereas periphrastic or less lexicalized expressions are used to convey marked situa-
tions (Horn 2004). For example, using the longer expression cause to die can implicate 
that a death was brought about by non-stereotypical means, for which the briefer form 
kill would have been inappropriate (see Shibatani 1975; McCawley 1978; Comrie 1985). 
If this approach is extended to complementizers in embedded contexts, the inclusion 
of the complementizer creates a more prolix form, and if prolixity is associated with 
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markedness, the use of the complementizer may in turn signal a more marked reading. If 
causality is the default, then the marked form that includes the optional complementizer 
should favor the non-causal reading.4 
The meanings that arise for kill and cause to die seem to stand in starker contrast to 
each other than do the subtle variations in causal connectedness we observe. A speaker 
flouts the maxim of Manner in producing cause to die and generates a strong implica-
ture. However, there are other contexts in which quite subtle distinctions in meaning are 
attributed to the calculation of implicatures via principles of cooperative communica-
tion. For example, Levinson (2000: 148–149) compares (25a, b), which vary only in the 
presence/absence of the second subject.
(25) a. He went to the store and bought some whiskey.
b. He went to the store and he bought some whiskey.
Levinson observes that (25a) supports an interpretation of a single complex action of 
“store-going-in-order-to-whiskey-buy”, whereas (25b) more easily permits the interpre-
tation of two independently initiated actions. This distinction is claimed to arise via a 
maxim of minimization: “Say as little as necessary; that is, produce the minimal linguistic 
information sufficient to achieve your communicational ends” (Levinson 2000: 114). In 
this way, a component of the maxim of Manner (minimization of form) has been invoked 
to explain a subtle distinction in meaning between the portrayal of a single complex event 
and two independent events. Examples (25a–b) are particularly analogous to our results 
because they manipulate the presence/absence of an optional word which serves primar-
ily to establish structure (verb phrase coordination in (25a) versus sentence coordination 
in (25b)) without changing the event-level semantics of who did what to whom. As with 
our complementizer manipulation, the manipulation in (25a–b) achieves a change in the 
perceived closeness of the two actions whereby the shorter version is more tightly inte-
grated.
In sum, our results are broadly compatible with accounts that depend in part on syn-
tactic mechanisms, those that appeal to notions of iconicity or cooperative communi-
cation, or processing accounts which invoke information-theoretic constraints. Further 
empirical work will be needed to tease apart these explanations, including the follow-up 
ideas discussed above. What the theories do have in common is the incorporation of 
multiple factors in processing and an iconic interpretation of distance between clauses. 
We believe that the potential syntactic difference between CP and TP coordination is 
not the complete explanation for the processing effect, since on that theory at least one 
version of the structure should be unambiguous. A combination of iconic distance and 
parallelism of structure may provide the most compelling account. In all cases, though, 
the theoretical machinery involved must permit a semantically bland complementizer 
to have repercussions for discourse-level interpretation. In the end, that is the aspect of 
our findings we find most interesting—that the inference of causal coherence relations 
is influenced by linguistic elements that have nothing to do with causal reasoning. Such 
influence can be observed only by considering contexts in which coherence relations 
operate within the sentence, where structural forces can be brought to bear on pragmatic 
inferences.
 4 That said, a quick search of the parsed Wall Street Journal text in the Penn Tree Bank (using tgrep2; D. L. 
T. Rohde 2004) found 80 cases of a “verb that S and that S” structure but only 31 of a “verb that S and S”. 
Further work is needed to determine if this distribution is general and what coherence relationships are 
expressed by each structure in corpora, but our markedness claim must be speculative at this time.
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